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JAPAN’S EXPERIENCE WITH DEPOSIT
INSURANCE AND FAILING BANKS:
IMPLICATIONS FOR FINANCIAL
REGULATORY DESIGN?
CURTIS J. MILHAUPT *
This Article examines three decades of Japanese experience with deposit
insurance and failing banks, and analyzes the implications of that experience
for bank safety net reform in other countries. To date, the literature and
policy debate on deposit insurance have been heavily colored by U.S.
banking history and have focused almost exclusively on explicit deposit
protection schemes. Analysis of Japan’s safety net experience suggests that
(a) deposit insurance, for all its flaws, is superior to the real-world
alternative—implicit government protection of depositors and discretionary
regulatory intervention in bank distress, (b) a well-designed explicit deposit
insurance system that includes a credible bank closure policy is the starting
point for the design of effective private alternatives to a government-run
safety net, and (c) the trend toward greater institutionalization of the
Japanese safety net—culminating in recent legislation to address the
financial crisis—reflects increased political competition and greater
emphasis on legal as opposed to reputational systems of economic ordering
in that country.
I. INTRODUCTION
It is axiomatic that one of the central roles of government is to establish
the ground rules for economic activity. In this capacity as “institutional
designer,”1 few governments in the past decade have made policy choices
* Fuyo Professor of Law and Director, Center for Japanese Legal Studies, Columbia Law
School. This Article was prepared while the author was a visiting scholar at the Institute for Monetary
and Economic Studies, Bank of Japan. This Article is a revised version of an article published in 17
MONETARY & ECON. STUDIES No. 2 (1999). The author thanks the members of Division Two of the
Institute for providing an extraordinarily hospitable research environment. Keiko Harimoto, Masaki
Honda, Tomohiro Kinoshita, and Wataru Takahashi of the Institute were particularly generous in
sharing their expertise. Victor Goldberg, Jeffrey Gordon, Shinsaku Iwahara, Geoffrey Miller, Frank
Packer, Mark Ramseyer, Robert Thompson, Mark West, and workshop participants at the Bank of
Japan and the University of Tokyo provided stimulating comments on an earlier draft. The views
expressed in the Article are solely those of the author and should not be attributed to the Bank of Japan
or its staff.
1. Masahiko Aoki, The Japanese Firm as a System of Attributes: A Survey and Research
Agenda, in THE JAPANESE FIRM: THE SOURCES OF C MPETITIVE STRENGTH 11, 30 (Masahiko Aoki &
Ronald Dore eds., 1994).
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more controversial and costly than those relating to deposit insurance and
other components of the bank safety net.
As recent events in world financial markets have demonstrated, on this
central issue of institutional design, the stakes are high, and the results may
best be described as dismal. While governments have expended enormous
resources to promote bank stability, systemic banking insolvencies in the last
two decades have been commonplace.2 Resolving these problems has been
expensive, involving wealth transfers of spectacular dimensions. In many
cases, it has cost between twenty and fifty percent of the affected country’s
GDP to bail out troubled banks.3 More importantly, perhaps, history has
shown that poorly designed deposit protection and other safety net
mechanisms are worse than ineffective in the prevention of banking distress.
An obvious illustration is the U.S. savings and loan crisis, in which the state-
supplied incentive structure dramatically increased bank risk taking, at great
eventual cost to taxpayers.
Although there is universal recognition that greater market discipline for
banks is essential, there is little agreement about how the ground rules for
banking should be changed to accomplish this objective. In the world of
policy analysis, the moral hazard effects inherent in deposit insurance have
led many commentators to conclude that it should be replaced by private
alternatives. Others have argued in favor of implicit deposit protection,
theorizing that “constructive ambiguity” about the government’s response to
banking distress will constrain excessive risk taking by private entrepreneurs.
In the world of policy implementation, deposit insurance and other bank
safety net protections continue to be advocated, adopted, and expanded.
There is no consensus on the safety net for the “architecture” of the
international financial system.4
This Article examines Japan’s experience with deposit insurance and
failing banks, and analyzes the implications of that experience for safety net
reform in other countries. To date, the literature and policy debate have been
heavily colored by U.S. banking history. This is not surprising given that the
United States pioneered modern-day deposit insurance and suffered an abject
lesson in its flaws. It is unfortunate, however, because existing literature is
short on analyses of real-world implicit and semiprivate deposit protection
2. For a list of bank insolvency crises in almost 70 countries since the 1970s, see GERARD
CAPRIO, JR. & DANIELA KLINGEBIEL, BANK INSOLVENCIES: CROSS COUNTRY EXPERIENCE (World
Bank Policy Research Working Paper No. 1620, 1996).
3. See id. The term “bank” will be used in the Article to denote any depository institution.
4. On bank stability and financial architecture, see BANK FOR INT’L SETTLEMENTS,
INTERNATIONAL BANKING AND FINANCIAL MARKET DEVELOPMENTS 3 (1998).
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schemes, concepts underlying many reform proposals. Separately, but not
less importantly, while banks are widely viewed as delegated monitors in the
Japanese system of corporate governance, the governance of Japanese banks
has drawn very little scholarly attention. An abundant literature explores
Japanese bank involvement in borrower distress without considering the
governance of failure within the Japanese banking sector itself. Analysis of
Japan’s safety net experience provides the opportunity to redress these gaps
in the literature.
Arguably, no other country has had as varied and turbulent an experience
with bank safety nets as Japan. Deposit insurance was not established in
Japan until 1971, almost forty years after it was implemented in the United
States. For the next two decades, however, financial regulators, working in
tandem with the banking sector, continued to operate a highly successful
implicit safety net that rendered the formal deposit protection system
superfluous. In the past decade, however, changes in the economic, political,
and regulatory environments following the collapse of the bubble economy
caused the implicit safety net to fail spectacularly, leaving a gaping hole in
Japan’s bank regulatory infrastructure. Over the past several years, few
policy issues in Japan have commanded more public attention and political
acrimony than the redesign of the safety net. These efforts have recently
culminated in the passage of legislation that commits enormous financial
resources to redesigning the governance of failure in Japanese banking.
I draw the following principal conclusions from the Japanese experience.
First, for all its flaws, explicit government-administered deposit insurance is
superior to the most likely real-world alternative—implicit government
protection of banks. Given the apparent inevitability of some form of
government safety net, transparent ex ante ground rules for governmental
intervention in bank distress, which are most likely to be developed as part of
an explicit deposit insurance system, are preferable to protections based on
the noninstitutionalized reputation and discretionary intervention of financial
regulators. Second, the political economy of bank failure makes the
development of effective private alternatives highly unlikely absent
mechanisms to constrain government intervention in banking distress. As
demonstrated by Japan, without a credible commitment to bank closure,
ostensible delegations of bank risk monitoring and loss guarantee functions
from government to the private sector are likely to be both illusory and
inconsistent with market discipline. Thus, a well-designed explicit deposit
insurance system that includes a credible bank closure policy is the starting
point for the design of effective private alternatives. In view of the preceding
conclusions, I view the trend toward greater institutionalization of the
Japanese safety net as a promising development reflecting significant
Washington University Open Scholarship
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changes in that country’s political and legal structures. While these assertions
may seem quite limited and unsurprising to readers unversed in bank
regulatory literature, they in fact run counter to the predominant normative
conclusions about deposit insurance.
A caveat at the outset: this Article is not an all-purpose defense of deposit
insurance; nor will it show that criticisms of deposit insurance are completely
misplaced, either with respect to the United States or Japan. On this point,
theory and history speak for themselves. Rather, this Article has more modest
goals: to clarify the real-world regulatory design alternative to deposit
insurance and to show that in this as in other areas of economic
policymaking, institutions trump the ad hoc interventions of government
agents charged with promoting the social good.
The remainder of the Article is organized as follows: Part II sketches a
simple framework for understanding design choices in the promotion of bank
stability. This framework provides a brief review of past theoretical and
policy debates, guiding the discussion in the remainder of the Article. Part III
analyzes three distinct phases in recent Japanese banking history relating to
deposit insurance and the resolution of failing banks. Part IV draws principal
lessons and policy implications from the Japanese experience, with
consideration for the bearing that experience might have on safety net
initiatives in other countries. Part V offers a brief conclusion.
II. SAFETY NETS AND REGULATORY DESIGN
Governments care deeply about bank stability. Whether banks merit this
attention is the subject of enormous debate. In general terms, government
intervention in bank distress rests on three principal factors. First, banks are
uniquely susceptible to runs and panics due to their financial structure and
economic functions.5 Second, in virtually all countries, banks are the
dominant providers of payment services, absorbing liquidity pressures and
credit exposures on behalf of their customers. Widespread bank failure would
5. Banks specialize in asset transformation, turning short-term, liquid assets (deposits) into
longer-term, less marketable assets (loans). Since banks maintain reserves against only a fraction of
their liabilities, mass depositor withdrawals can lead to liquidity crises and insolvency even for
otherwise sound institutions. The presence of information asymmetries heightens this risk. Since bank
loans contain borrower-specific information that may be inaccessible to depositors, runs can occur at
both good and bad banks. See FREDERIC S. MISHKIN, UNDERSTANDING FINANCIAL CRISES: A
DEVELOPING COUNTRY PERSPECTIVE 7 (National Bureau of Econ. Research Working Paper No. 5600,
1996). Disorderly withdrawals at one bank can create uncertainty about the health of the entire
financial system, leading to a contagion effect. See Douglas W. Diamond & Philip H. Dybvig, Bank
Runs, Deposit Insurance, and Liquidity, 91 J. POL. ECON. 401 (1983) (showing that bank panics can be
self-fulfilling).
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thus lead to severe, economy-wide disruptions.6 Finally, in their activities as
private economic agents, banks serve as the “transmission belt” for the
conduct of the central bank’s monetary policy. Consequently, as one
commentator notes, “for ordinary businesses, insolvency is viewed as a
quasi-Darwinian mechanism that improves the health of the corporate herd,
but for banks it is viewed as a social disaster.”7 More precisely, the potential
for disaster is thought to lie in systemic risk—the threat that idiosyncratic
bank distress will lead to the successive infection of other financial
institutions, eventually engulfing the real economy.8
To minimize this threat, many governments have introduced bank safety
nets consisting principally of deposit insurance and the lender of last resort
facility. Deposit insurance systems, designed to dampen the threat of bank
runs and panics, typically provide the ground rules for government
intervention in failing bank situations by specifying the amount of insurance
coverage, the measures available to the insuring agency to resolve insolvent
banks, and the conditions for their implementation.9 Through last resort
lending, the central bank provides liquidity on preferential terms to
institutions during periods of unusual economic stress.
As is now universally recognized, however, safety net initiatives produce
their own problems. Deposit insurance is a put option for bank
shareholders;10 last resort lending creates a precedent in which distressed
banks become eligible for low-cost liquidity support. Thus, while
government safety nets are designed to promote bank stability, they
simultaneously provide incentives to increase bank risk, making bank failure
6. See JONATHAN R. MACEY & GEOFFREY P. MILLER, BANKING LAW AND REGULATION 52-61
(2d ed. 1997).
7. Edward L. Rubin, Discretion and Its Discontents, 72 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 1299, 1324-25
(1997).
8. See generally BANKING, FINANCIAL MARKETS, AND SYSTEMIC RISK (George G. Kaufman
ed., 1995).
9. See SAMUEL H. TALLEY & IGNACIO MAS, DEPOSIT INSURANCE IN DEVELOPING COUNTRIES
34-41, 61-69 (World Bank Policy, Research, and External Affairs Working Paper No. WPS 548,
1990).
10. See, e.g., Robert C. Merton, An Analytic Derivation of the Cost of Deposit Insurance Loan
Guarantees, 1 J. BANKING & FIN. 3 (1977); Kenneth E. Scott, Deposit Insurance and Bank
Regulation: The Policy Choices, 44 BUS. LAW. 907, 910-11 (1989). A bank shareholder’s residual
claimant status includes not only the right to retain all profits from the use of depositor’s funds, but
also a valuable option to “put” the bank to the insuring agency in the event that management’s gambles
do not pay off. See id. Perversely, the value of this option increases as the riskiness of bank assets
increases and bank capital decreases. See id. Worse yet, since deposit insurance premiums are not
adjusted for risk in any country other than the United States (a recent development), banks with lower
quality assets and more risk-loving managers can free ride off the insurance fund contributions of
stronger, more risk-averse banks. Much of the ensuing discussion will focus on deposit insurance, the
most central and controversial component of the bank safety net.
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more likely.11 This necessitates a panoply of additional regulatory structures,
including bank examinations, capital requirements, and portfolio restrictions,
to limit excessive risk taking. Deposit insurance is thus often viewed as the
starting point for understanding bank regulation generally.12
The banking literature also examines how the existence of a government-
administered safety net produces agency conflicts that exacerbate the risk-
shifting effects just discussed. For example, the safety net can be
manipulated to serve political interests. Jonathan Macey, for example, argues
that regulatory capture leads to loose bank closure policies that favor bank
shareholders.13 Even in the absence of political influence, several
commentators show that regulatory self-interest will lead to bank closure
policies more lax than the social optimum. They analyze the career and
reputational interests of those in charge of the deposit insurance fund,
showing that the incentive structure promotes obfuscation and delay in
connection with banking problems.14 Whether motivated by politics or self-
interest, the literature demonstrates that the agency conflict created by formal
safety nets leads to regulatory forbearance.
This much is familiar and widely accepted. Not surprisingly, therefore,
some conclude from the weight of the historical and theoretical evidence that
11. Deposit insurance eliminates the incentive for an important class of fixed claimants—
depositors—to monitor bank managers. This shields banks from the application of basic corporate
finance principles. See Jonathan R. Macey & Geoffrey P. Miller, Bank Failures, Risk Monitoring, and
the Market for Bank Control, 88 COLUM. L. REV. 1153, 1200-01 (1988). Simultaneously, deposit
insurance distorts the investment decisions of the bank’s shareholders and managers, who are
motivated to adopt high-risk investment strategies. See id. at 1201.
12. See Sudipto Bhattacharya & Anjan V. Thakor, Contemporary Banking Theory, 3 J. FIN.
INTERMEDIATION 2, 31 (1993).
13. See Jonathan R. Macey, The Political Science of Regulating Bank Risk, 49 OHIO ST. L.J.
1277, 1284-85 (1989). In this view, the primary beneficiaries of deposit insurance and other
components of bank regulation are the shareholders of the regulated banks themselves, who enjoy
policies that actually subsidize their risk-taking activities. Macey asserts that capture provides a
particularly robust explanation for agency behavior in bank regulation due to the complexity of the
issues involved. This complexity invites the participation of organized groups and deference to
legislative committees, while rendering outside monitoring of the resulting legislation difficult. See id.
at 1288-90.
14. See Arnoud W.A. Boot & Anjan V. Thakor, Self-Interested Bank Regulation, AM. ECON.
REV., May 1993, at 206; Edward J. Kane, Changing Incentives Facing Financial-Services Regulators,
2 J. FIN. SERVS. RES. 265 (1989). Kane argues that officials are initially slow to appreciate problems
in the banking sector that jeopardize the insurance fund because they lack adequate information to
recognize private-sector innovations that shift risk onto the fund—“honorable but slow regulatory
adaptation.” Kane, supra, at 266. This is followed by dishonest denial of banking sector distress to
conceal problems that could jeopardize the reputation and career advancement of the regulators. See
id. Similarly, Boot and Thakor hypothesize that regulators temporize in the face of bank distress
because intervention to close a bank may cause the market to downgrade its assessment of the
regulator, since closure signals the existence of inadequate capital and the regulator’s failure to enforce
a less risky asset choice. See Boot & Thakor, supra, at 211-12.
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol77/iss2/4
p399 Milhaupt.doc 07/27/99   10:57 AM
1999] JAPAN’S EXPERIENCE WITH DEPOSIT INSURANCE 405
“[t]he ultimate reform of deposit insurance may be its elimination.”15 Some
commentators, for example, suggest replacing deposit insurance with a
private insurance scheme.16 Similarly, Eugene White argues that private
alternatives are superior to deposit insurance for developing and transition
economies, due to the incentive problems and regulatory demands the latter
entails.17 Charles Calomiris18 and others19 have suggested that government
guarantees be supplemented or replaced by networks of guarantees worked
out among financial institutions. The guarantors would serve as delegated
monitors of the firms whose risks they are covering. Alternatively, many
commentators have advocated maintaining deposit insurance, but only with
respect to a tightly controlled class of “narrow” banks holding full reserves
against deposits in the form of highly liquid securities.20 In exchange for
retraction of safety net protections, all other financial institutions would be
free to operate without significant regulatory intervention.
So familiar is the stylized account of deposit insurance—heavily colored
though it is by the history and politics of U.S. banking21—that less formal
government interventions to protect failing banks, in fact the most common
response to the problem of bank instability, have received scant attention in
the literature. As two World Bank researchers have noted, “[w]ithout
explicitly recognizing the fact, th[e] vast literature [on deposit insurance] has
employed an analytical framework that compares a deposit insurance system
against a system where the government extends no protection to
15. Bhattacharya & Thakor, supra note 12, at 7.
16. See Cheryl D. Block, Overt and Covert Bailouts: Developing a Public Bailout Policy, 67
IND. L.J. 951, 984-87 (1992).
17. See EUGENE WHITE, DEPOSIT INSURANCE 10-13 (World Bank Policy Research Working
Paper No. 1541, 1995).
18. See Charles W. Calomiris, Is Deposit Insurance Necessary? A Historical Perspective, 50 J.
ECON. HIST. 283 (1990).
19. See Tom Petri & Bert Ely, How to Make the Financial Giants Behave, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 5,
1998, at A19.
20. See, e.g., Geoffrey P. Miller, On the Obsolescence of Commercial Banking, 154 J.
INSTITUTIONAL & THEORETICAL ECON. 61, 65 (1998).
21. In the stylized account, deposit insurance was introduced in the United States in the wake of
the Great Depression. Like many economic policies, its implementation owes more to politics than to
economic theory. When many small banks faced collapse in 1933, they pressed Congress for federal
deposit insurance. The alternative, industry consolidation and an end to unit banking requirements
which increased bank risk, was a political nonstarter. For a time, the arrangement worked: bank runs
were eliminated, banks failed without creating systemic problems, and deposit insurance was viewed
as one of the most successful of the New Deal programs. See Robert Charles Clark, The Soundness of
Financial Intermediaries, 86 YALE L.J. 1 (1976). That assessment changed dramatically in light of the
savings and loan and banking crises of the 1980s, in which weak institutions shifted risks onto the
federal deposit insurance funds. Moreover, regulators created accounting gimmicks and other
measures that concealed the depths of the problems and delayed their resolution, at great cost to
taxpayers.
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depositors.”22
This sense of the policy design alternatives, however, is confirmed neither
by theoretical insight nor empirical observation. There are two closely related
theoretical explanations for the existence of bank regulation to control risk,
even in the absence of explicit deposit insurance. First, flaws in depositor
discipline resulting from information asymmetries provide a rationale for
government regulation to reduce bank risk taking.23 Second, the economic
functions of banks render these institutions particularly susceptible to
behavioral biases that cloud the accurate estimation and disclosure of risk.24
These problems explain the existence of substantial regulations to control
bank risk even in economies without deposit insurance systems.25
Empirical observation also discredits the view that a world without
deposit insurance is a world of market discipline for banks. One recent
survey shows that virtually all governments without explicit deposit
protection systems nonetheless provide implicit deposit protection.26 In fact,
22. TALLEY & MAS, supra note 9, at 6.
23. See MISHKIN, supra note 5. There is theoretical and empirical support for depositor discipline
as a device to constrain bank risk. See Jonathan R. Macey & Elizabeth H. Garrett, Market Discipline
by Depositors: A Summary of the Theoretical and Empirical Arguments, 5 YALE J. ON REG. 215
(1988). As the authors themselves recognize, however, the evidence suggests that depositor discipline
is an effective supplement to regulatory constraints on bank risk. See id. at 236-37.
24. See Donald C. Langevoort, Organized Illusions: A Behavioral Theory of Why Corporations
Mislead Stock Market Investors (And Cause Other Social Harms), 146 U. PA. L. REV. 101, 152-56
(1997). The first type of behavioral bias is the commitment bias. See id. at 152-53. A fundamental
precept of individual psychology is that once a person has committed to a particular course of action,
there is a strong motivation to resist data suggesting the existence of a superior option. Subsequent
beliefs will be conformed to support the chosen path, creating a tendency to “throw good money after
bad.” This bias poses substantial risks for the banking industry, where the quality of assets consisting
principally of promises to pay sums of money in the future (loans) must be continually reevaluated,
and loan officers must decide whether further credit should be extended to troubled borrowers.
Second, organizations, like individuals, are susceptible to an optimism bias. See id. at 153-56.
That is, all firms seek to prevent runs on their resources by adopting optimistic public faces. See id. at
115-16. This bias is likely to distort public disclosures made by firms. Banks, which are particularly
susceptible to runs due to their financial structure, may be even more likely than commercial firms to
systematically downplay the riskiness of their assets.
25. Of course, these same theoretical insights explain why all bank risk regulation will be flawed,
even in the absence of deposit insurance. The regulators’ key task—monitoring the quality of bank
assets—will be hampered by the same information asymmetries and behavioral biases that afflict
bankers. Information problems make it difficult for regulators to assess bank risk. The commitment
bias reinforces considerable political and personal incentives to prop up distressed banks. The
optimism bias, which applies to regulatory agencies as well as firms, could lead agencies to downplay
bank problems to maintain a public image of competence, stability, and control with respect to matters
under their jurisdiction. The bureaucratic structure in which all bank risk monitoring takes place only
accentuates these problematic tendencies.
26. See ALEXANDER KYEI, DEPOSIT PROTECTION ARRANGEMENTS: A SURVEY (International
Monetary Fund Working Paper No. WP/95/134, 1995).
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implicit safety nets are more prevalent than the explicit variety.27 In an
implicit deposit protection scheme, government intervention is discretionary
and ad hoc.28  Depositors receive assurances, not from the existence of a
formal insurance fund, but from the government’s intention to safeguard the
stability of the financial system. These assurances might be implied from the
government’s past conduct or stated intentions.29  Government adherence to a
bank failure policy has been advocated in the literature,30 but ra ly
implemented.31 Thus, in reality, “[b]ank losses are quasi-fiscal deficits, even
in highly private, market-based economies.”32
The few commentators who have analyzed implicit safety nets suggest
that they might generate less moral hazard than the explicit variety. Frederic
Mishkin reasons that in an implicit system the government has the flexibility
to respond only to systemic crises, rather than being formally bound to
protect all banks.33 Depositors thus have incentive to withdraw funds from
banks facing idiosyncratic shocks, providing discipline against excessive risk
taking. In apparent adherence to similar logic, the European Central Bank has
concluded that rules on the operation of the safety net should remain opaque,
so that the financial sector is kept guessing about the authorities’ reaction to a
banking crisis.34  Other analysts advocate an implicit deposit insurance
scheme for banking systems with insufficient prudential regulatory
capacities.35
27. A 1995 survey showed that 55 countries maintained implicit deposit protection arrangements
while 47 countries maintained explicit protections. See id. at 5 tbl.2.
28. See TALLEY & MAS, supra note 9, at 9.
29. See KYEI, supra note 26, at 2.
30. See, e.g., A. Dale Tussing, The Case for Bank Failure, J.L. & ECON., Oct. 1967, at 129.
31. New Zealand is currently the only country in which the government explicitly refuses to
protect the depositors of failing banks. See KYEI, supra note 26, at 3 tbl.1. Argentina experimented
with a credible commitment to bank failure but reinstituted a formal deposit protection system almost
immediately in the face of a serious financial and political crisis. See id. at 4; see also Geoffrey P.
Miller, Is Deposit Insurance Inevitable? Lessons from Argentina, 16 INT’L REV. L. & ECON. 211
(1996). A government pursuing a bank failure policy must do more than simply forego the
establishment of a deposit insurance regime; constitutional or statutory measures prohibiting state
involvement in troubled banks must be developed to make the commitment to bank failure credible.
32. Andrew Sheng, The United States: Resolving Systemic Crisis, 1981-91, in BANK
RESTRUCTURING: LESSONS FROM THE 1980S, at 71, 84 (Andrew Sheng ed., 1996).
33. See MISHKIN, supra note 5, at 9-10.
34. See Wolfgang Münchau, To Avoid Moral Hazard, Opacity May Be the Rule, FIN. TIMES,
Sept. 8, 1998, at 3.
35. See ASLI DEMIRGÜÇS-KUNT & ENRICA DETRAGIACHE, THE DETERMINANTS OF BANKING
CRISES: EVIDENCE FROM DEVELOPING AND DEVELOPED COUNTRIES (World Bank Working Paper No.
WP/97/106, 1997).
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The discussion now turns to Japan, which offers the opportunity to
examine the theoretical and policy debate by exploring a social experiment in
implicit and semiprivate alternatives to deposit insurance.
III. DEPOSIT INSURANCE AND THE GOVERNANCE OF BANK DISTRESS
IN JAPAN
For purposes of analysis, the Japanese experience can be divided into
three slightly overlapping phases: the period from 1971-92, in which a
formal safety net was established but eschewed in favor of an intricate set of
informal regulatory practices designed to promote bank stability; the period
from 1992-97, in which the informal safety net was stretched to the breaking
point and beyond, leading to a series of deviations from traditional patterns of
regulatory intervention in banking distress; and the late 1990s, in which a
new, explicit safety net has been under construction in tandem with other
institutional and political realignments.
A. Deposit Insurance and the Implicit Safety Net
Japan’s deposit insurance system was established in 1971, ostensibly to
protect bank depositors and maintain the stability of the financial system in
the face of increased competition resulting from financial liberalization. The
system is administered by the Deposit Insurance Corporation (“DIC”), a
special corporation established under the Deposit Insurance Law with capital
contributed by the Ministry of Finance (“MOF”), the Bank of Japan (“BOJ”),
and private financial institutions.36 There are several distinctive
characteristics of Japanese deposit insurance.37  First, membership is
compulsory for virtually all depository institutions.38 Sec d, DIC’s original
mandate was limited to collecting insurance premiums and paying off
insured depositors of failed institutions.39 Thu , unlike the U.S. Federal
Deposit Insurance Corporation (“FDIC”), DIC was not envisioned as playing
an active role in the resolution of distressed financial institutions. Third,
36. See Yokin hoken hÇ, Deposit Insurance Law, Law No. 34 of 1971. The statutory payoff limit
has been increased several times and is currently ¥10 million (approximately $91,000) per depositor.
All yen amounts have been converted to U.S. dollars at a rate of $1 = 110. In addition, deposits at
agricultural cooperatives are protected under a separate statute. Deposits in a postal savings system are
also covered by an explicit guarantee.
37. See INSTITUTE FOR MONETARY & ECON. STUDIES OF THE BANK OF JAPAN, THE JAPANESE
FINANCIAL SYSTEM 58 (Yoshio Suzuki ed., 1987).
38. See id.
39. See id.
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol77/iss2/4
p399 Milhaupt.doc 07/27/99   10:57 AM
1999] JAPAN’S EXPERIENCE WITH DEPOSIT INSURANCE 409
private financial institutions are represented in the management of DIC.40
Three other components of the explicit regime for failing banks in Japan
should also be noted. First, as lender of last resort, the BOJ is empowered to
provide loans to liquidity-troubled financial institutions.41 Second, under
Article 26 of the Banking Law,42 the operations of a bank can be suspended
by the regulatory authorities, although no formal guidelines for the exercise
of this authority existed until recently. Third, prior to 1998, Japanese law did
not provide for separate insolvency procedures for banks; thus, unlike the
situation in the United States, the formal insolvency mechanisms applied to
both banks and commercial firms.43
For most of the postwar period, however, this explicit regime played
virtually no role in the governance of bank failure in Japan. This is
particularly true with respect to deposit insurance, which is apparent from a
review of DIC’s resources and institutional design during the first two
decades of its existence.44 From its inception, DIC was poorly funded,
understaffed, and largely subsumed within the operations of the BOJ.45 
Although there were Japanese bank failures in the 1970s and 1980s, the
deposit insurance fund was not utilized until 1992, when DIC provided
financial assistance to facilitate a rescue merger for a small failed bank.46 
40. See id.
41. This authority was initially provided in Article 25 of the original Bank of Japan Law. Under
current law, the BOJ is legally empowered to provide secured or unsecured loans to financial
institutions. See Nihon ginkÇ hÇ, Bank of Japan Law, Law No. 67 of 1942, arts. 33, 37, as amended. In
response to a request by the Minister of Finance, the BOJ may also provide loans and conduct other
business when it is deemed essential for the maintenance of order in the financial system. See Bank of
Japan Law, art. 38.
42. GinkÇ hÇ, Banking Law, Law No. 59 of 1981, as amended.
43. In the United States, banks are specifically exempted from the Bankruptcy Code. See 11
U.S.C. § 109(b)(2) (1994).
44. For a contrary view, see MAXIMILIAN J.B. HALL, DEPOSIT INSURANCE REFORM IN JAPAN 19
(Loughborough Univ. Banking Centre Research Paper No. 123/98, 1998) (arguing that “[d]eposit
insurance has played an important part in stabilising the Japanese banking and financial sectors since
its inception in 1971”). The lender-of-last-resort function, by contrast, has been utilized in several
cases in the past, beginning with loans to a large securities firm in 1965.
45. While the percentage of bank deposits covered by insurance is similar in Japan and the
United States, the ratio of insurance fund reserves to covered deposits in Japan since the inception of
the deposit protection system has consistently been far lower than the corresponding U.S. figure. For
example, in 1995 the ratio was .07 for Japan and 1.30 for the United States. See DEPOSIT INSURANCE
CORPORATION, YOKIN HOKEN KIKÇ NENPÇ [ANNUAL REPORT] 52 (1998) [hereinafter DIC ANNUAL
REPORT]; FEDERAL DEPOSIT INSURANCE CORPORATION, ANNUAL REPORT 110 (1996).
For the first two decades of its existence, DIC staff numbered less than ten. Because its staff was
so small, office space and technical support were provided to DIC by the BOJ. See FEDERATION OF
BANKERS ASS’NS OF JAPAN (ZENGINKYÇ), THE BANKING SYSTEM OF JAPAN 48 (1994) [hereinafter
ZENGINKYÇ]; Masaru Yoshitomi, The “Jusen” Debacle and Japanese Economy, Address Before the
Wharton School of the University of Pennsylvania (Apr. 17, 1996) (transcript on file with author).
46. See DIC ANNUAL REPORT, supra note 45, at 42; ZENGINKYÇ, supra note 45, at 48.
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The deposit insurance fund has never been used to pay off depositors of a
failed institution.
Focusing solely on the formal safety net, however, masks an intricate and
historically successful informal process of managing the failure of financial
institutions in Japan. As one Japanese commentator notes, “the most
important safety net system in this country has not been the deposit insurance
system, but the public’s confidence in the MOF and the BOJ’s ability to
avoid a [sic] major instability in the financial system.”47  While both
journalistic and scholarly accounts have come to refer to the Japanese
regulatory approach to bank failure as the “convoy policy,” it is helpful to
break this policy down into several interrelated but distinct components. The
financial regulators were able to avoid systemic problems by playing the
leading role in the formation and enforcement of the following well-
developed set of informal norms governing bank distress:48
1. Survival of the Weakest: Interest rates and other regulations were set to
permit the survival of the weakest member of the banking industry, whose
numbers were kept manageable by high barriers to entry. In addition to
enhancing the durability of the industry as a whole, the survival of the
weakest norm supported pricing arrangements that allowed the weakest
member to stay in business, while allowing more efficient producers to earn
supercompetitive profits. These economic rents were used to compensate for
the monitoring and rescue operations undertaken by the stronger firms.
2. No Exit (No Failure): Almost a corollary of the principle of survival of
the weakest was that of no exit: no member of the banking industry was
allowed to exit (fail), other than through merger with a stronger member.
This enhanced stability both by preventing the failure of weaker members
and by increasing public confidence in supervisory capabilities.
3. Responsibility and Equitable Subordination: When the danger of
financial failure grew, the parent or principal source of funding for the failing
entity was expected to take responsibility by extending financial assistance
and by subordinating its claims to those of other creditors, even if not legally
required to do so. This norm encouraged monitoring by stronger firms, by
imposing both monetary and reputational costs on stronger players who
allowed smaller institutions to fall into difficulty.
4. Implicit Government Insurance: The preceding norms led naturally to a
47. KAZUO UEDA, CAUSES OF THE JAPANESE BANKING INSTABILITY IN THE 1990S, at 14
(University of Tokyo Faculty of Econ. Discussion Paper Series No. 96-F-17, 1996).
48. The textual discussion is drawn from Curtis J. Milhaupt & Geoffrey P. Miller, Cooperation,
Conflict, and Convergence in Japanese Finance: Evidence from the “Jusen” Problem, 29 LAW &
POL’Y INT’L BUS. 1, 19-20 (1997).
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norm of implicit insurance provided by the government. If strong members
were expected to assist weaker members and if no member of the industry
were allowed to fail, some entity had to backstop the strong members. Thus,
an implicit grant of government insurance was inherent in the operation of
the other norms. Put differently, the responsibility norm extended even to the
government.
For many years these norms instilled confidence in the financial industry
and its regulators. In effect, a partnership was created between the public and
private sectors to enhance financial stability and protect depositors. Until the
beginning of this decade, these norms were Japan’s safety net, and the
institution of deposit insurance did not matter.49
Under this approach, the MOF arranged for stronger banks to absorb
insolvent institutions through what amounted to informal, administratively
orchestrated purchase and assumption (“P&A”) transactions.50 Strong banks,
acting under the MOF’s guidance and encouragement, purchased the assets
and assumed the liabilities of failing institutions. At times, MOF officials
were dispatched to the boards of troubled banks. This signaled the
government’s commitment not to allow the bank to fail and prepared the way
for a rescue merger.51 In addition, at times the BOJ provided loans to
distressed banks in order to prevent systemic crises.
Disclosure practices among industry participants complemented this
norm- and reputation-based approach to bank failure. With MOF support,
troubled financial institutions traditionally minimized disclosures of
nonperforming assets, often while liquidating portfolio assets in order to
show a profit. These measures helped to maintain an aura of financial
soundness while mergers and other financial assistance were arranged behind
the scenes.52 These practices were so highly ingrained that the reporting of an
annual loss by a major Japanese bank in 1995—the first in postwar history—
was said to signal a significant shift in official and market disclosure
49. Thus, characterizing Japan as having an explicit deposit insurance system, see KYEI, supra
note 26, at 3 tbl.1, is accurate but somewhat misleading.
50. See Yoshitomi, supra note 45.
51. See AKIYOSHI HORIUCHI, FINANCIAL FRAGILITY IN JAPAN: A GOVERNANCE ISSUE 7
(University of Tokyo Faculty of Econ. Working Paper No. CIRJE-F-5, 1998).
52. See JON CHOY, TOKYO DRAWS ROADMAP TO SOLVE BAD-LOAN CRISIS (Japan Econ. Inst.
Report No. 22B, 1995). To illustrate, in two recent cases, the severity of a firm’s financial problems
were not publicly disclosed prior to bankruptcy. For the fiscal year ending in March 1997, Hokkaido
Takushoku Bank reported capital of ¥298 billion; six months later, inspections after the bank’s
collapse revealed negative equity of ¥240 billion. Similarly, off balance sheet losses amounting to over
half of Yamaichi Securities’ capital were not revealed by MOF or BOJ inspections prior to its collapse
in late 1997.
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philosophy.53 The concentration of borrower-specific and other risk-related
information in the hands of main banks and MOF regulators largely disabled
the market mechanism as a viable tool of risk monitoring and constraint.
It is important to note that the beneficiaries of this implicit safety net were
not simply depositors, but the banking sector itself. Bank stability is
important everywhere; it is, however, crucial in Japan, where a relatively
small number of very large banks have played key roles in postwar corporate
finance and governance.54 The no failure norm, therefore, was not only based
on political considerations but also drew at least qualified support from
economic theory: a given Japanese bank was the sole repository of
considerable borrower-specific information that could not be transferred
costlessly to other lenders. Bank failure would thus jeopardize assets far
more wide ranging than shareholders’ equity.55 Deposit protection was a
natural corollary to this regime, but the centrality of banks to the economy
provided an independent and perhaps overriding justification for the no
failure policy. This conclusion draws support from predeposit insurance
Japanese banking history, in which policymakers did not hesitate to impose
losses on depositors when necessary to strengthen the banking industry.56
The prevailing regulatory environment supported the implicit safety net in
several ways. For example, portfolio restrictions limited the ability of banks
to hold risky assets and to generate volatile off-balance sheet revenues. More
importantly, the anticompetitive effects of a heavily segmented industry with
high entry barriers endowed banks with substantial economic rents,
increasing the value of a bank charter. As Keeley has shown, high charter
values help to constrain excessive risk taking that could lead to bank
failure.57 Simultaneously, the MOF’s branch licensing authority provided the
incentives needed to encourage rescues of troubled banks.58
53. See THOMAS F. CARGILL ET AL., THE POLITICAL ECONOMY OF JAPANESE MONETARY
POLICY 136 (1997).
54. It is interesting to note that Japanese banking law explicitly ties the regulation of bank
soundness to the public character of the banking business. See GinkÇ hÇ, Banking Law, Law No. 59 of
1981, art. 1. Commentators critical of bank regulation in the United States dispute the quasi-public
nature of banking, where the law contains no such concession to the public interest.
55. Of course, economic theory also predicts substantial moral hazard effects in a banking
system that does not permit failure. The crucial regulatory task is thus properly calibrating protection
and market discipline.
56. Large depositors were subjected to losses during a banking crisis in 1927; moreover, many
depositors suffered losses from bank failures in the immediate postwar period. Both episodes led to
bank consolidation in Japan.
57. See Michael C. Keeley, Deposit Insurance, Risk, and Market Power in Banking, AM. ECON.
REV., Dec. 1990, at 1183.
58. Authorization for new branches was highly coveted by industry participants, since branch
growth constituted the principal form of competition among major banks under a regulated interest
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Finally and very significantly, the institutional structure for failing bank
resolutions discouraged resort to the explicit deposit protection scheme. As
previously noted, the Deposit Insurance Law did not initially contemplate a
role for DIC in bank failures beyond deposit payoffs. In 1986 the law was
amended to permit DIC to provide financial assistance in connection with
mergers of troubled banks; however, the amount of assistance was limited to
the hypothetical cost of paying off depositors.59 Since the cost of resolving
the troubled institutions exceeded this limit, mergers took place outside the
formal deposit protection system. Moreover, under the Deposit Insurance
Law, resort to the bankruptcy process results in deposit payoffs,60 which is a
disfavored approach to bank distress even in the United States. Thus, the
legal framework provided an unpalatable menu of formal options for MOF
officials.
The implicit safety net functioned well in a favorable economic
environment and gained credibility from the stable political and bureaucratic
structures in Japan. The long dominance of the Liberal Democratic Party
(“LDP”) eliminated the threat that other political parties would renege on the
implicit government insurance norm or otherwise alter the uncodified safety
net to favor different interest groups. Finally, the MOF’s long-standing
reputation as a highly competent and uncorrupt regulator gave it the moral
authority to act as coordinator and enforcer of the informal arrangements.
B. Breakdown of the Implicit Safety Net
Developments in the 1990s, however, seriously undermined these pillars
of the implicit safety net. Regulators found it increasingly difficult to
persuade financial institutions to provide assistance to failing firms of all
types in the postbubble environment. Even large banks faced serious
nonperforming loan problems, low returns on equity, and weak capital bases,
making them unwilling to play the role of white knight. Moreover, the
explosive growth of shareholder derivative litigation in Japan following a
1993 amendment to the Commercial Code raised the specter of personal
liability for bank managers who used shareholder funds to rescue troubled
institutions. Simultaneously, a series of policy missteps and scandals during
the bubble and its aftermath seriously eroded the credibility of the financial
rate regime. Indeed, one of the stated rationales for the establishment of an explicit deposit insurance
system in the early 1970s was the desire to enhance competition by eliminating the practice of granting
this type of regulatory favor to rescuing banks. See KIN’Yã SEIDO CHÇSA KAI [FINANCIAL SYSTEM
RESEARCH COUNCIL], YOKIN HOKEN SEIDO [THE DEPOSIT INSURANCE SYSTEM] 5-12 (1969).
59. See Yokin hoken hÇ, Deposit Insurance Law, Law No. 34 of 1971, art. 64.
60. See id. art. 49(2).
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regulators that was so crucial to the operation of the informal safety net. As
the stability of entire classes of financial institutions was imperiled by
economic developments, it became increasingly clear that more systematic
approaches to the problem of financial instability were necessary. In the first
half of the 1990s, resolution techniques became more highly
institutionalized, involving the use of specialized public entities to recover
nonperforming loans. A tortuous progression over time toward more rule-
and market-based resolution methods is evident, but a coherent, formal
approach to troubled banks would not emerge until the implicit regime had
been thoroughly undermined.
1. DIC-Assisted Mergers
As financial liberalization progressed, the Deposit Insurance Law was
amended in anticipation of a more important role for DIC in the resolution of
distressed banks. A 1986 amendment strengthened DIC’s financial condition
and provided the authority for DIC to extend financial assistance for the
promotion of mergers of insolvent depository institutions with stronger
banks.61 Beginning in 1992, a series of DIC-assisted mergers was carried out
among troubled credit cooperatives, shinkin (nonprofit cooperative) banks,
and regional banks. Since that time, DIC has extended financial assistance in
more than twenty cases. By 1995, however, these operations had rendered
the deposit insurance fund insolvent.62
2. Failed Credit Cooperatives and the Tokyo Kyodo Bank
In 1995 the Tokyo Kyodo Bank was established to hold the assets of two
failed credit cooperatives. Funds for this bank were contributed by
commercial banks, DIC, the BOJ, and the Tokyo metropolitan government,
which regulated the failed cooperatives. The possibility of further
insolvencies among credit cooperatives led to the reorganization of the bank
in September 1996 into the Resolution and Collection Bank (“RCB”) as a
subsidiary of DIC. This institution was loosely modeled after the U.S.
Resolution Trust Corporation, serving to liquidate the business and assets of
failed credit cooperatives. Liabilities of the RCB are guaranteed and losses
are compensated by DIC, which is empowered to act as conservator of failed
61. See id. art. 64. The amendment raised insurance premiums and increased DIC’s line of credit
from the BOJ.
62. See CARGILL ET AL., supra note 53, at 127-32.
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol77/iss2/4
p399 Milhaupt.doc 07/27/99   10:57 AM
1999] JAPAN’S EXPERIENCE WITH DEPOSIT INSURANCE 415
cooperatives.63
3. The Jusen Problem and the Housing Loan Administration64
An elaborate resolution scheme was employed in response to the “jusen
problem,” one of the most contentious and highly politicized episodes in
modern Japanese financial history. The jusen problem merits fairly detailed
exposition, as it illustrates problems inherent in the implicit safety net and
helped to catalyze the movement toward more law- and market-based
resolution techniques.
In the early 1970s, seven home mortgage lending companies (“jusen”)
were established as nonbank subsidiaries of major financial institutions. The
money they lent was borrowed from three groups of financial institutions:
their parent entities (known as the “founding banks”), politically powerful
agricultural credit cooperatives, and other lenders. The jusen problem can be
traced to several convergent factors, including lax oversight, financial
liberalization, and the bubble economy. From their inception, the jusen
companies were not carefully monitored by government authorities,
managers, or shareholders. In part, monitoring was diluted by the presence of
large numbers of MOF alumni on the boards of the jusen companies and by
less-than-arm’s-length relationships between the jusen and the major
financial institutions which had established them as nonbank subsidiaries.
Financial liberalization in the late 1970s and 1980s seriously eroded the jusen
companies’ market niche because as banks lost corporate borrowers to the
capital markets, they increased lending to individuals. In response, the jusen
companies turned aggressively to real estate lending. This move coincided
with the speculative excesses of the bubble era and the flow of a torrent of
cash into the jusen companies from the agricultural cooperatives.
Agricultural cooperative lending was spurred in part by the exemption of the
jusen companies from MOF administrative guidance that imposed limitations
on real estate lending in the banking sector.
MOF inspections of the jusen companies in 1991—the first ever—
revealed that almost forty percent of their loans were nonperforming. Under
MOF guidance, ten-year restructuring plans were undertaken for each of the
jusen companies. Concessionary interest rates and longer repayment
schedules were negotiated on loans to the jusen companies, on the
assumption that improved land values would eliminate the problem.
Consistent with the implicit norms outlined above, the founding banks took
63. See id. at 125-28.
64. Much of the material in this section is drawn from Milhaupt & Miller, supra note 48.
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the biggest loss on their loans by eliminating all interest. In addition, the
MOF circulated an ambiguous memo suggesting that the founding banks and
perhaps even the MOF itself would guarantee repayment of the principal of
all loans made by the agricultural cooperatives, which were generally
perceived to be the weakest institutions involved, other than the jusen
companies themselves.
Rather than dealing effectively with the problem, however, this
forbearance led to a huge increase in the percentage of nonperforming assets
held by the jusen companies. Land values did not improve as anticipated,
additional loans extended by the agricultural cooperatives turned bad, and by
1995 all of the jusen companies were insolvent. Collectively, almost seventy-
five percent of the jusen assets were nonperforming, and the jusen problem
had reached crisis proportions. Adding to the urgency of the situation was the
appearance of the Japan Premium in the Eurodollar market (see Table 1). In
part, the premium reflected the unusual systemic risk that regulators would
undermine the strength of major Japanese banks by requiring them to bear
more than their pro-rata share of jusen losses—a reflection of the
“responsibility” norm in the parlance of this Article.
Following months of extraordinarily contentious and politically charged
negotiations among the major lenders to the jusen companies, their
regulators,65 and political leaders, the Diet enacted a plan to allocate the
losses. The resolution scheme called for the liquidation of the jusen
companies, with their assets split into two groups. Completely unrecoverable
assets were written off immediately, generating “first stage losses” of ¥6.4
trillion ($58 billion). These losses were shared among the three groups of
lenders to the jusen companies in the following manner: founding banks
wrote off the entire amount of their loans to the jusen companies (¥3.5
trillion), other institutional lenders wrote off about half of their loans (¥1.7
trillion), and the agricultural cooperatives “contributed” ¥530 billion, only
about ten percent of their loans, despite their status as the largest lenders to
the jusen companies. The agricultural cooperative funds were cast as a
“contribution” to lend credence to the claim that these institutions were the
innocent victims of founding bank improprieties and mismanagement, bore
no responsibility for the collapse of the jusen companies, and thus were
entitled to full recovery of their loans.
65. The founding banks are regulated by the MOF; the agricultural cooperatives are regulated
principally by the Ministry of Agriculture, Forestry, and Fisheries. Resolution of the jusen problem
was complicated by this division of regulatory responsibility and by the political power of the
agricultural cooperatives.
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The agricultural cooperatives’ minimal share of the losses left a ¥680
billion ($6.2 billion) shortfall in the coverage of first-stage losses, which
could only be filled by injecting public funds into the resolution scheme.66
While the amount is relatively small, the use of public funds in a resolution
framework perceived as nontransparent, politically motivated, and without
legal basis created a firestorm of political controversy.
The remaining ¥6.6 trillion ($60 billion) of jusen assets were transferred
to the Housing Loan Administration Corporation (“HLAC”) which was
established as a subsidiary of DIC to recover these assets over a fifteen-year
period. “Secondary losses” resulting from uncollectible loans will be covered
from special DIC accounts “voluntarily” established by the jusen founding
banks and other lenders at MOF insistence and, if necessary, from public
funds.
It is fair to question why the failure of the jusen companies was the
subject of such massive regulatory attention. These were not depository
institutions, and a variety of corporate insolvency laws were available to
govern their orderly exit from the market. In reality, however, the jusen
resolution was a depositor protection scheme, albeit an indirect and heavily
negotiated, semiprivate one. If the agricultural cooperatives had been forced
to bear their pro-rata share of the jusen losses, many of them would have
been rendered insolvent. Thus, the depositors of the agricultural
cooperatives—most of whom are farmers with longstanding loyalties to the
LDP—were protected at the expense of founding bank shareholders and
Japanese taxpayers. In the end, the traditional norms governing financial
institution distress could be applied only in modified form due to the
enormity of the losses involved and the rapidly changing financial and legal
environments in which both the public and private sectors were operating.
4. Major Financial Institution Failures
The complete demise of the implicit safety net might accurately be dated
to 1997. Autumn of that year witnessed the collapse of Japan’s tenth-largest
bank and its fourth-largest securities firm, as well as the failure of a major
life insurance company and a second-tier securities house.67 Significantly,
major shareholders and firms affiliated with these failing institutions refused
66. MOF officials attempted to pressure the founding banks to cover the additional shortfall, but
bank managers refused on the ground that such action would expose them to personal liability to
shareholders.
67. See, e.g., Gillian Tettand & Bethan Hutton, Japan Tries to Stop Run on Banks, FIN. TIMES,
Nov. 29, 1997, at 3 (discussing lack of confidence in Japanese financial system following failure of
several major institutions, including Yamaichi Securities and Hokkaido Tokushoku Bank).
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to come to their aid. Moreover, stronger, unaffiliated institutions resisted the
MOF’s attempts to broker rescue mergers. This episode represents a
watershed in regulatory approaches to failing banks in Japan, indicating that
the ground rules for the operation of the safety net were open to complete
revision. Although MOF officials scrambled to reassert the no failure norm
through public statements that no other major banks would be allowed to fail,
the credibility of the financial system fell to an all-time low.68
Events of the past several years, therefore, exposed a legal and policy
vacuum of considerable dimensions. For decades, while operating under a
comprehensive implicit safety net, there was little need for a highly
developed institutional structure to govern deposit protection and bank
closure. Postbubble economic, political, and regulatory conditions rendered
the no failure norm inoperable, yet no coherent substitute was in place to
address the serious problems facing Japanese banks. As reflected in the Japan
Premium,69 a massive loss of confidence in the country’s financial
institutions and supervisory structures ensued.
C. Institutionalizing the Safety Net
Policymakers struggled against political and bureaucratic inertia to fill the
vacuum. By late 1998, these efforts had culminated in an explicit framework
governing bank risk regulation, failed bank resolutions, and bank
recapitalizations. While it is too early to fully evaluate the effectiveness of
this program, its broad outlines can be sketched, revealing a movement
toward greater institutionalization of the bank safety net.
The first set of reforms was inspired by the jusen problem. The moral
hazard for managers and investors produced by the no failure norm and the
unusual systemic risk produced by the responsibility norm heightened
awareness of the need for both more market-oriented and more formal
regulatory processes to deal with troubled banks. In 1996 legislation was
enacted to decrease regulatory discretion in dealing with ailing financial
firms and to increase market discipline on financial intermediaries. These
reform measures included two major changes relating to the treatment of
failing financial institutions. First, a system of prompt corrective action based
on objective criteria was instituted to deal with financial institutions in failing
health.70 Similar to U.S. legislation enacted in the wake of the savings and
68. See, e.g., Kazunori Yokota & Masato Ishizawa, Government Tries to Calm Investor Fears,
NIKKEI WEEKLY, Dec. 1, 1997, at 1.
69. See Table 1, supra p. 417.
70. See GinkÇ hÇ, Banking Law, Law No. 59 of 1981, art. 26; Banking Law Enforcement Order
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol77/iss2/4
p399 Milhaupt.doc 07/27/99   10:57 AM
420 WASHINGTON UNIVERSITY LAW QUARTERLY [VOL. 77:399
loan crisis,71 this law was designed to prevent politically palatable but
economically costly regulatory forbearance. Under the law, banks are
required to engage in periodic self-assessments of capital, subject to external
audit. When a bank’s capital ratio deteriorates beyond certain benchmarks, a
newly established Financial Supervisory Agency (“FSA”)72 is required to
undertake increasingly stringent measures to minimize the risk to the deposit
insurance fund. Depending on how severely capital is impaired, a bank may
be required to raise capital, sell assets, or even cease operations. A second
bill enacted in 1996 conferred upon regulators the authority to initiate
corporate reorganization or bankruptcy procedures with respect to financial
institutions to deal with insolvencies in a more formal and timely manner.73
These measures, in a major departure from past Japanese financial
practices, contemplate that regulators will allow, and even force, insolvent
banks to exit the market. In order to prepare for this eventuality, other bills
raised deposit insurance premiums74 and established the HLAC and the RCB,
the two previously mentioned public collection agencies, for the recovery of
assets of failed institutions.75 I  view of the seriousness of the financial
situation and the inadequacy of past disclosure practices, however, the
government guaranteed all deposits (including those above the statutory
payoff limit of ¥10 million) through fiscal year 2000. Finally, a temporary
exception to the payoff cost limit for financial assistance was made to the
Deposit Insurance Law. Through fiscal year 2000, financial assistance for
mergers of weak institutions may exceed the payoff cost limit if the
Commissioner of the FSA determines in consultation with the BOJ that a
merger is necessary to maintain the stability of the financial system.76
No. 10 of March 21, 1982, as amended, arts. 21-2, 21-3. The prompt corrective action regime took
effect in April 1998.
71. See Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation Improvement Act of 1991, Pub. L. No. 102-242,
§ 131, 105 Stat. 2236, 2253 (codified as 12 U.S.C. § 1831o (1994)).
72. The Financial Supervisory Agency assumed supervisory responsibilities over the banking,
securities, and insurance industries from the MOF on June 22, 1998.
73. See Kin’yã kikan no kÇsei tetsuzuki no tokureitÇ ni kansuru hÇritsu, Bill to Implement
Special Procedures for Reorganizing Financial Institutions, Law No. 95 of 1996.
74. See YÇkin hokenhÇ no ichibu wo kaisei suru hÇritsu, Bill to Amend the Deposit Insurance
Law, Law No. 96 of 1996. Insurance premiums were quadrupled from 1.2 basis points to 4.8 basis
points, and a special premium of 3.6 basis points was assessed for five years.
75. The HLAC was established under the Tokutei jãsen kin’yã kikan senmon gaisha no saimu
saiken no shori no sokushintÇ ni kansuru tokubetsu sochihÇ, Special Measures Law to Promote the
Resolution of the Assets and Liabilities of the Jusen Companies, Law No. 93 of 1996. RCB was
established under the Bill to Amend the Deposit Insurance Law.
76. See Yokin hoken hÇ, Deposit Insurance Law, Law No. 34 of 1971, Supplementary
Provisions, art. 16. Note the similarity to the too-big-to-fail treatment under U.S. banking law.
Normally, the FDIC is required to select the resolution technique that imposes the least cost on the
federal deposit insurance fund. See 12 U.S.C. § 1823(c)(4) (1994). Application of the “least cost
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The financial condition and organizational structure of DIC were further
strengthened by amendments to the Deposit Insurance Law in early 1998.
DIC now is expected to play a much more central role in the resolution of
failing financial institutions than in the past. The amendments bolstered
DIC’s financial condition with a ¥17 trillion ($155 billion) appropriation to
be used for depositor protection. DIC’s capacity to collect nonperforming
loans was enhanced with the creation of a committee to investigate civil and
criminal liability in connection with bank failures and the reformation of the
RCB into a general purpose “bad bank” to take over nonperforming assets in
connection with the failure of any financial institution. In addition to
enhanced financial and formal resources, DIC’s staff was increased to almost
three hundred.
Finally, and most significantly, two packages of legislation were enacted
in late 1998 that significantly redesigned the governance of bank failure in
Japan. Key aspects of this legislation were heavily influenced by opposition
party demands in arduous political bargaining taking place over the course of
more than two months.77 The legislation contemplates a massive injection of
public money through the DIC infrastructure to be used for the protection of
depositors, the resolution of failed banks, and the recapitalization of solvent
but undercapitalized banks (see Table 2).
First, through fiscal year 2000, insolvent banks will be subjected to an
entirely new formal resolution process.78 R flecting the demands of the
opposition parties, Article One of the law sets out the principle that insolvent
financial institutions are to be liquidated. It goes on, however, to provide that
various mechanisms to handle bank failures are to be established to support
the credit system and protect depositors. A formally independent Financial
Revitalization Commission is established under the Prime Minister’s Office
to administer the system. This Commission will identify insolvent banks
based on FSA examinations and select an appropriate resolution method
resolution test” can be waived if the FDIC, Federal Reserve Board, and Treasury Secretary (in
consultation with the President) determine that complying with the test would pose systemic risk. See
id. § 1823(c)(4)(G).
77. In July 1998 the LDP lost its majority in the Upper House of the Diet. Since approval of both
houses of the Diet is necessary for bills to become law, the LDP was forced to negotiate with several
key opposition parties in order to obtain passage of the banking legislation.
Major areas of disagreement between the LDP and the opposition included the circumstances
under which public money should be injected into financial institutions that have not formally failed,
the amount of balance sheet information to be disclosed to the public, particularly for institutions
accepting public funds, the specific receivership mechanisms to be created to deal with failed banks,
and the structure of bank regulatory oversight. As to each of these issues, it is fair to characterize the
opposition proposals as reflecting a greater concern for market discipline than the initial LDP bills.
78. See Kin’yã kinÇ no saisei no tame no kinkyã sochi ni kansuru hÇritsu, Law on Emergency
Measures to Revitalize the Functions of the Financial System, Law No. 132 of 1998.
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TABLE 2: PUBLIC FUNDS FOR FINANCIAL SYSTEM STABILIZATION
 10 trillion
Government
BOJ
Private Financial
Institutions
DIC
     Financial
Revitalization Account
  Account for Prompt
Financial Restructuring
Special      
Account      Depositor Protection
Total  60 trillion
 Liquidation,
 Temporary Nationalization,
 Bridge Banks
 Recapitalization
    Government
Bonds
     7 trillion
 Funding  18 trillion
 25 trillion
Guarantee
 53 trillion
Source: Nikkei Shimbun, Oct. 13,
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specified in the law. Insolvent banks must either be (1) operated by a public
administrator as a bridge bank to assume the business until a private
successor institution emerges, or (2) temporarily nationalized by placement
under special public management. Where the Commission determines that
systemic risk is posed by a bank’s failure, insolvent or nearly insolvent
institutions will be temporarily nationalized through DIC’s compulsory
acquisition of their shares, at a price determined by the Commission. Public
management of the bank will terminate when the bank has been rehabilitated,
a private successor emerges, or its shares are reprivatized. Under both
resolution mechanisms, nonperforming loans will be transferred to a new
Resolution and Collection Organization (“RCO”),79 and sound borrowers of
the failed bank will continue to receive funding to prevent a chain reaction of
bankruptcies in the real economy.
In addition, the legislation attempts to create a more effective legal
framework for the recovery of nonperforming loans. The RCO was created
through the merger of the HLAC and the RCB. Modeled after the U.S.
Resolution Trust Corporation, the RCO has the authority to purchase
nonperforming loans from both failed and solvent banks. In addition, various
procedural improvements were made to streamline the debt collection,
auction, and asset liquidation processes.
A second package of legislation passed in late 1998 provides a framework
for the recapitalization of distressed banks.80 The legislation replaced a ¥13
trillion recapitalization fund that was eliminated at the insistence of
opposition parties.81 The law provides for the RCO to purchase the common
stock, preferred stock, or subordinated bonds issued by, and to extend
subordinated loans to, banks whose capital is below various prescribed
levels. The capital will be supplied upon application by a bank, provided that
various conditions are met.82 These conditions, also largely the product of
79. See id.
80. See Kin’yã kinÇ no sÇki kenzenka no tame no kinkyã sochi ni kansuru hÇritsu, Law on
Emergency Measures to Promptly Restore the Sound Functioning of the Financial System, Law No.
143 of 1998.
81. The initial fund, established in early 1998, failed to improve bank health. Bank managers
were reluctant to accept capital from the fund out of the fear that their institutions would be perceived
as weak by the market. Ultimately, 21 banks received virtually equal and insignificant amounts of new
capital. See DIC ANNUAL REPORT, supra note 45, at 49.
82. Critically undercapitalized banks with a capital adequacy ratio between 0-2% are eligible to
receive capital only if they agree to drastic management and structural reforms, provided that their
continued operation is deemed indispensable to the regional economy. Banks with a capital adequacy
ratio in excess of 8% are eligible to receive capital only if they agree to acquire a failing bank or it is
deemed necessary to prevent a credit contraction. Banks with a capital adequacy ratio of between 8%
and 4% are required to undertake various restructuring efforts that could include resignations of top
management and reductions in shareholder capital.
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opposition party demands, are designed to reduce moral hazard stemming
from the use of public funds to prop up weak institutions. Together, the two
sets of legislation contemplate the use of ¥60 trillion ($550 billion), or
approximately 12% of Japan’s GDP, to protect depositors and restore the
health of the banking sector.83
A key remaining question is what will happen after March 31, 2001,
when, in accordance with its terms, the 1998 legislation ceases to be
effective, and the payoff cost limit is reimposed on extensions of public
financial assistance to support mergers of weak institutions. If no new
mechanisms for the resolution of failing banks are enacted to replace this
legislation, the bank safety net will revert largely to the state that existed
before the Japanese financial crisis became apparent. With the notable
addition of the prompt corrective action regime, the only legal mechanisms
available to regulators to deal with weak and insolvent banks will be the
bankruptcy regime, which requires deposit payoffs and financial assistance
for mergers limited to the deposit payoff amount. Given the reluctance of
regulators to use deposit payoffs, this institutional setup would place all of
the stress from bank closures on the prophylactic mechanisms contemplated
by the prompt corrective action regime. If this regime buckles under the
stress,84 there is a real danger that Japan would slip back into a pattern of
nontransparent, administratively orchestrated bank resolutions. It is essential,
therefore, that a permanent safety net with specific mechanisms for the
closure of failed banks be erected prior to the year 2001.
IV. LESSONS AND POLICY IMPLICATIONS
Japan’s financial problems in the 1990s find obvious parallels in the bank
and savings and loans crises experienced by the United States in the previous
decade. For a time, banks in both systems managed to function well under
quite distinct, politically contrived safety nets with deep roots in regulatory
self-preservation. Eventually, however, both systems succumbed to an
identical economic logic rooted in moral hazard. Yet casual observers who
83. In March 1999, 7.5 trillion of public funds was invested in fifteen major banks pursuant to
the Law on Emergency Measures to Revitalize the Functions of the Financial System. See Japan
Finalizes Public Fund Injection for Banks, JIJI PRESS TICKER SERV., Mar. 12, 1999. It is anticipated
that a portion of these funds will be returned to the treasury upon the reprivatization of nationalized
banks and bridge banks and through receipt of dividend income.
84. Japan does not have a strong tradition of aggressive law enforcement by independent
regulatory agencies. Therefore, some skepticism about the viability of the prompt corrective action
regime is in order, particularly since this approach to bank failure is basically untested even in the
United States, from which it was imported.
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simply chalk up the Japanese experience as another dismal lesson in the
problems of deposit insurance85 miss a more nuanced evaluation with
potential implications for safety net initiatives in other countries.
The unique historical and political circumstances of deposit insurance in
the United States have caused many analysts to focus rather narrowly on that
institution as the principal source of problems in the regulation of bank risk.
It is instructive to note, however, that the explicit deposit insurance system
played virtually no role in the creation of Japan’s banking crisis. The serious
moral hazard effects which contributed to the jusen debacle and the high-risk
lending practices of Japanese banks in the bubble period were created not by
deposit insurance, but by the implicit norms that governed the resolution of
financial distress in Japan for many decades. Regulatory forbearance
occurred, not principally to protect a deposit insurance fund, but because half
measures in the face of bank problems are the inevitable political and
behavioral response of government agents pursuing an open-ended mandate
to promote financial stability. Deposit insurance as an institution simply did
not matter in Japan until the early 1990s, by which time the land mines that
exploded into the present financial crisis had already been laid.
Recognition of this fact provides a slightly different perspective on the
U.S. banking crises as well. Arguably, the most serious problems in the
United States were caused, not by the explicit portions of the safety net, but
by the development of the “too-big-to-fail” norm and the FDIC’s selection of
resolution techniques for failed banks that protected virtually all uninsured
depositors.86 These policies were not firmly grounded in law, but rather
resulted from discretionary expansions of the safety net into an implicit
realm. Absent formal constraints on regulatory action, safety nets tend to
metastasize.
The importance of the implicit portions of Japan’s safety net suggests that
the debate over bank regulatory design would benefit from a careful
comparison of the real-world alternatives to a government-administered
deposit insurance program and a recognition that some form of government
intervention in the plight of failing banks is virtually inevitable. In some
cases this inevitability may stem from the political pressures of depositors,
85. See, e.g., Max Walsh, No Bonus to Claim in Deposit Insurance, SYDNEY MORNING HERALD,
Jan. 15, 1997, at 29.
86. In the United States between 1979 and 1989, 99.7% of all deposit liabilities at failed
commercial banks were protected. See Ron Feldman & Arthur Rolnick, Fixing FDICIA: A Plan to
Address the Too-Big-To-Fail Problem, in FEDERAL RESERVE BANK OF MINNEAPOLIS 1997 ANNUAL
REPORT (1998); see also Arthur Rolnick, The Alarming Costs of Preventing Bank Runs, in FEDERAL
RESERVE BANK OF MINNEAPOLIS, FEDGAZETTE  (1991).
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who of course double as voters.87 In other cases, it is a function of the
distinctive role that banks play in the political economy, operating as
transmission belts for industrial policy and corporate governance. Whether
banks are “special” from a purely economic perspective is open to debate,
but there is little question that banks in virtually every country are unique in
the degree to which they combine public and private economic functions,
maintain intimate linkages to political actors, and are perceived as crucial
connective tissue for the real economy.
Perhaps some day technological and economic changes will fully erode
this unique status, political patterns will adjust accordingly, and the
governmental safety net will be pulled out from under banks. In fact,
however, the trend is in the opposite direction, as regulators extend the safety
net to other financial intermediaries whose failure is deemed to pose systemic
risk.88 Thus, there is reason to expect that governments will continue to
intervene in banking crises even in the absence of a formal deposit insurance
system. This point is confirmed by the widespread use of implicit deposit
protection systems around the world and by bank bailouts in countries that
have far less extensive formal deposit protection systems than the United
States.89  A key policy question, therefore, is how these protections should be
provided.
Japan’s experience suggests several reasons why a well-designed, explicit
safety net is the superior institutional choice. First, although implicit
arrangements were successful in Japan for many years, the Japanese
approach may not serve as a good model for other countries. As an initial
matter, characterizing the implicit safety net as a success requires
qualification insofar as it was essentially untested until the 1990s, when it
proved incapable of responding to crisis. Moreover, even accepting the
desirable qualities of this system, replicating Japan’s traditional approach to
bank failure in other countries may prove difficult.90 Implicit deposit
87. See Miller, supra note 31.
88. Witness the informal rescue of the hedge fund Long-Term Capital Management with the
support of the Federal Reserve Bank of New York.
89. See Frederic S. Mishkin, Comment on Systemic Risk, in BANKING, FINANCIAL MARKETS,
AND SYSTEMIC RISK, supra note 8, at 31, 43.
90. The experience of the United Kingdom is also instructive and offers some interesting
parallels to postwar Japanese banking history. Regulators in the United Kingdom also operated a
successful, informal, and discretionary safety net, thanks largely to the credibility of the Bank of
England and intimate ties to the private financial sector. For many decades, the Bank of England was
able to coordinate rescue efforts by banks and other financial institutions in the absence of statutory
underpinning. In the early 1990s, the private sector began refusing to take on risk in connection with
these rescues, and the Bank of England was forced to assume responsibility. There are significant legal
issues involved in the Bank’s rescue efforts and use of public funds for such purposes because no such
authority is provided by the Bank of England Act or the Banking Act of 1987. The author is grateful to
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protection schemes appear to function most effectively in environments that
are out of step with current trends in international financial markets.
Competition must be limited and entry barriers must be high to channel a
stream of rents to the banking sector. Regulators must maintain a near
monopoly on information serving as the basis for prudential policy.
Similarly, disclosure of problems in the industry must be limited in order to
protect regulatory reputation and avoid stresses on an underdeveloped
institutional framework. Competition-distorting incentives may be needed to
encourage informal resolutions of bank distress. The regulators must
themselves maintain a high reputation for expertise and propriety, while
enjoying broad policymaking autonomy. While this delicate balance was
maintained in Japan through several decades of high economic growth, the
collapse of the implicit safety net over the course of this decade is a
cautionary tale for policymakers elsewhere who would replicate the Japanese
approach to bank regulation.91
Second, Japan’s experience indicates that implicit safety nets not only
suffer from the moral hazard and forbearance flaws found in explicit
systems, but also generate additional problems. The lack of a formal
institutional structure for failed bank resolutions compounded the country’s
financial problems, as a legal and policy vacuum of significant dimensions
opened where the traditional bank governance model once stood. The
resulting uncertainty and nontransparency of the implicit regime, which led
to the emergence of the Japan Premium, exacerbated bank liquidity problems
by making interbank lending more expensive for all Japanese banks,
regardless of strength.92 T e informal safety net may also have contributed to
the poor profitability of the Japanese banking sector, a leading factor in the
Japanese financial crisis.93 Excess capacity, which holds down bank
Shinsaku Iwahara for calling attention to the U.K. experience.
91. Theoretically, it is possible to conceive of an implicit deposit protection scheme that does not
give rise to moral hazard, lead to nontransparency problems, or require anticompetitive industry
practices. Such a system, presumably operating in tandem with a private insurance regime, would
involve wise and politically unbiased decisions by regulators to selectively intervene only in systemic
banking problems, with such intervention triggering substantial penalties for shareholders and
managers of affected institutions. To date, however, no government has managed to meet this ideal.
92. See Joe Peek & Eric S. Rosengren, Determinants of the Japan Premium: Actions Speak
Louder Than Words (1998) (unpublished manuscript, on file with author). Until November 1997, both
Sanwa (with a Moody’s bank financial strength rating of C+) and Sakura (with a rating of D+) paid
virtually identical and insignificant spreads over that paid by Bank of Tokyo Mitsubishi (with a rating
of C+ ). See id. This suggests that the Japan Premium reflected systemic risk from Japan’s traditional
approach to bank distress, in which strong banks were pressured to assist weaker banks. Only after the
failure of Hokkaido Takushoku Bank in November 1997 did the international money markets begin to
draw distinctions among Japanese banks.
93. See ORGANISATION FOR ECON. CO-OPERATION AND DEVELOPMENT, ECONOMIC SURVEYS
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revenues, was built up in a regulatory system that essentially prohibited any
bank from exiting the market.94 P rhaps most importantly, developing a
framework to resolve bank distress and allocate the resulting burdens is an
enormously complex and politically charged undertaking. As the recent
political economy of Japanese banking demonstrates, that undertaking is all
the more difficult where a viable legal framework for bank closure does not
exist and the financial system is already in crisis.
The lack of credible bank closure policies in Japan rendered the
semiprivate nature of many resolution schemes illusory. If the ground rules
for bank closure remain obscure and the government retains significant
control rights over the disposition of bank assets, there is little reason to
believe that economic agents will develop market-regarding private
alternatives. This suggests that proposals to privatize deposit insurance,
create narrow banks, or develop private guarantee or delegated monitoring
arrangements are doomed to fail in the absence of credible commitments to
bank closure, which can only be provided by the government. Critical
examination and imaginative thinking to increase market discipline on banks
should be directed not only at circumscribing the scope of deposit insurance,
but also toward the creation of more incentive-compatible bank closure
mechanisms.
Japan also confirms the experience of the United States and numerous
other countries that, in the absence of an appropriate institutional structure,
financial liberalization can be extremely destabilizing. Regulatory structures
emphasizing informal bank risk monitoring were maintained even as those
risks began to multiply exponentially in a more competitive and innovative
environment. Increased competition from the capital markets diminished the
rents that had been channeled to the banking sector, eliminating the high
charter values that once constrained excessive risk taking. Private institutions
capable of disseminating information on risk, such as credit rating agencies
and a functional accounting profession, must be developed. Ironically, the
more competitive and transparent financial environment accompanying
deregulation also contributed to the rapidly declining credibility and stature
of the MOF, which came to symbolize the flaws in the traditional regulatory
approach. The MOF’s recent history demonstrates that, like banks, even the
JAPAN 52 (1997) [hereinafter OECD].
94. Several analysts have concluded that inefficiency and high costs are not the cause of the low
profitability of Japanese banks. Thus, raising profitability entails raising revenues, which can only be
accomplished by allowing banks to enter new business areas or by reducing the supply of financial
services to increase spreads. See OECD, supra note 93, at 52; DAVID ATKINSON ET AL., BIG BANG
WILL NEVER YIELD GLOBAL COMPARABILITY IN PROFITABILITY 7-9 (Goldman Sachs Global
Research Report, Jan. 9, 1997).
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most highly esteemed organizations can experience survival-jeopardizing
runs on their reputations. The point is not that financial liberalization should
be avoided, but that it must be preceded by reform of regulatory and
supervisory structures to accommodate new risks.
Finally, implicit safety nets seem particularly susceptible to the time
consistency problem identified by Professors Kydland and Prescott.95  Ad
hoc regulatory solutions to each bank insolvency may be “optimal” under
then prevailing circumstances, yet still lead to suboptimal outcomes over the
long term. This result follows because rational private agents will adjust their
behavior in anticipation of future discretionary governmental interventions;
those adjustments will eventually undermine the policy goals of the
regulators. This phenomenon is clearly illustrated in the behavior of the
agricultural cooperatives during the jusen episode. Early in its attempts to
work out the jusen companies’ financial problems, the MOF adopted ad hoc
strategies that disproportionately protected the investments of the agricultural
cooperatives, arguably the institutions least capable of absorbing losses. The
cooperatives responded rationally by increasing their loans to the faltering
jusen companies, thereby expanding the scope of the problem and
necessitating a more painful resolution a few years later. Thus, the Japanese
experience provides solid support for the conclusions reached by Boot and
Thakor96 and Calomiris97 that the sound operation of the safety net requires
rules rather than discretion.
In contrast to the flaws of implicit safety nets, a well-designed explicit
deposit insurance system has several benefits. First, an industry-supplied
pool of funds is created to deal with bank insolvencies; a well-capitalized
fund enhances the credibility of the commitment to bank closure. Second, the
fund provides an objective focal point for measuring agency performance.98
The existence of a fund may also provide incentives to resolve financial
distress more quickly. Finally, deposit insurance can signal a commitment by
the government to cap its exposure to the amount of the guarantee, avoiding
more sweeping intervention to protect depositors.99
As structured for the first two decades of its existence, Japan’s deposit
95. See Finn E. Kydland & Edward C. Prescott, Rules Rather Than Discretion: The
Inconsistency of Optimal Plans, 85 J. POL. ECON. 473 (1977).
96. See Boot & Thakor, supra note 14.
97. See Calomiris, supra note 18.
98. See Peter Swire, Bank Insolvency Law Now That It Matters Again, 42 DUKE L.J. 469, 522
(1992).
99. See Jonathan R. Macey & Geoffrey P. Miller, Deposit Insurance, the Implicit Regulatory
Contract, and the Mismatch in the Term Structure of Banks’ Assets and Liabilities, 12 YALE J. ON
REG. 1 (1995).
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insurance system did not generate any of these benefits because it was
overwhelmed by informal approaches to bank failure. Recently, political
competition has been an important force toward the creation of a more
formal institutional structure to govern bank distress. Indeed, the 1998
legislation to resolve bank insolvencies was significantly shaped by
opposition parties, who rejected the original bills drafted by the MOF at the
direction of the LDP. In this sense, the movement to create an explicit
deposit protection scheme parallels the movement to increase the
independence of the BOJ.100  In both cases, a noninstitutionalized,
reputational system hinging on MOF policy dominance gave way to greater
institutionalization as political competition increased and politicians began to
assert control over the policymaking process.
Finally, the inquiry into deposit insurance reform in Japan suggests a
research agenda for corporate governance scholars.101 The many models
revolving around a bank-centered system of corporate governance in Japan
are surely incomplete, and possibly deeply flawed, without a much better
understanding of the ways in which Japanese banks are themselves
monitored and disciplined.
V. CONCLUSION
The problems engendered by government underwriting of bank risk are
well known. Much prior analysis of deposit insurance, however, has been
colored by a false sense of the policy alternatives. Bank losses are quasi-
fiscal deficits around the world; bank distress invites extensive government
intervention everywhere. Put this way, deposit insurance looks more
promising than the real world alternative—a safety net operated at the
discretion of political agents. In the Japanese banking crisis, most of the
problems stemmed from the implicit portions of the safety net extended
through the discretion of those charged with promoting bank stability. On
reflection, the same is true of U.S. banking problems of the previous decade.
Well-designed deposit insurance systems—the crucial component of
which is a bank closure policy made credible by legal constraints on
regulatory autonomy—may be the starting point for the development of
effective private mechanisms to control bank risk and promote bank stability.
Perhaps before safety nets can be privatized, they must be institutionalized.
Japan’s experience with failing banks suggests that it is time to reevaluate the
100. See Susanne Lohmann, Is Japan Special? Monetary Linkages and Price Stability,
MONETARY & ECON. STUD., Dec. 1997, at 63.
101. At least one scholar has begun the inquiry. See HORIUCHI, supra note 51.
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promise of deposit insurance as an institution. It also suggests that it is time
to examine the mechanisms by which Japanese banks are monitored and
disciplined, a black box at the center of the comparative corporate
governance literature.
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